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Many theories have been put forward to explain the relationship between what Monism is the belief that ultimately the mind and the brain are the same thing. Katie Powers is available to meet with students to discuss the application process but focuses at its core on the relation of the brain to cognition and behavior. Barack Obama shortly after winning the US presidential election. Serious science writers take pains to describe quality neuroscience research accurately. into the brain will eventually and exhaustively explain the mind and, .. We could think of something which might have no direct relation or.
Reichenbach and M. Reichenbach said that mental events can be identified by the corresponding stimuli and responses much as the possibly unknown internal state of a photo-electric cell can be identified by the stimulus light falling on it and response electric current flowing from it.
In both cases the internal states can be physical states. However Carnap did regard the identity as a linguistic recommendation rather than as asserting a question of fact.
Mind Body Debate | Simply Psychology
Place's very original and pioneering paper was written after discussions at the University of Adelaide with J. Avowals were thought of as mere pieces of behaviour, as if saying that one had a pain was just doing a sophisticated sort of wince. Smart saw Ryle's theory as friendly to physicalism though that was not part of Ryle's motivation. Smart hoped that the hypotheticals would ultimately be explained by neuroscience and cybernetics.
Being unable to refute Place, and recognizing the unsatisfactoriness of Ryle's treatment of inner experience, to some extent recognized by Ryle himself Rylep. They would dangle from the nomological net of physical science and should strike one as implausible excrescences on the fair face of science. The Nature of the Identity Theory Place spoke of constitution rather than of identity. We find out whether this is a table in a different way from the way in which we find out that it is an old packing case.
We find out whether a thing is lightning by looking and that it is a motion of electric charges by theory and experiment.Mind Brain Relationship
This does not prevent the table being identical to the old packing case and the perceived lightning being nothing other than an electric discharge.
Feigl and Smart put the matter more in terms of the distinction between meaning and reference. Of course these expressions could be construed as referring to different things, different sequences of temporal stages of Venus, but not necessarily or most naturally so. There did seem to be a tendency among philosophers to have thought that identity statements needed to be necessary and a priori truths.
We had to find out that the identity holds. Aristotle, after all, thought that the brain was for cooling the blood. Descartes thought that consciousness is immaterial. It was sometimes objected that sensation statements are incorrigible whereas statements about brains are corrigible. The inference was made that there must be something different about sensations. Place, influenced by Martin, was able to explain the relative incorrigibility of sensation statements by their low claims: Nevertheless my sensation and my putative awareness of the sensation are distinct existences and so, by Hume's principle, it must be possible for one to occur without the other.
One should deny anything other than a relative incorrigibility Place As remarked above, Place preferred to express the theory by the notion of constitution, whereas Smart preferred to make prominent the notion of identity as it occurs in the axioms of identity in logic. So Smart had to say that if sensation X is identical to brain process Y then if Y is between my ears and is straight or circular absurdly to oversimplify then the sensation X is between my ears and is straight or circular.
Of course it is not presented to us as such in experience. Perhaps only the neuroscientist could know that it is straight or circular. The professor of anatomy might be identical with the dean of the medical school. A visitor might know that the professor hiccups in lectures but not know that the dean hiccups in lectures.
Phenomenal Properties and Topic-Neutral Analyses Someone might object that the dean of the medical school does not qua dean hiccup in lectures.
Qua dean he goes to meetings with the vice-chancellor. This is not to the point but there is a point behind it. This is that the property of being the professor of anatomy is not identical with the property of being the dean of the medical school. The question might be asked, that even if sensations are identical with brain processes, are there not introspected non-physical properties of sensations that are not identical with properties of brain processes?
How would a physicalist identity theorist deal with this? If you overheard only these words in a conversation you would not be able to tell whether the conversation was one of mathematics, physics, geology, history, theology, or any other subject.
Thus to say that a sensation is caused by lightning or the presence of a cabbage before my eyes leaves it open as to whether the sensation is non-physical as the dualist believes or is physical as the materialist believes.
This sentence also is neutral as to whether the properties of the sensation are physical or whether some of them are irreducibly psychical. To see how this idea can be applied to the present purpose let us consider the following example. Suppose that I have a yellow, green and purple striped mental image.
That is I would see or seem to see, for example, a flag or an array of lamps which is green, yellow and purple striped. Suppose also, as seems plausible, that there is nothing yellow, green and purple striped in the brain. Thus it is important for identity theorists to say as indeed they have done that sense data and images are not part of the furniture of the world.
This move should not be seen as merely an ad hoc device, since Ryle and J. Austin, in effect Wittgenstein, and others had provided arguments, as when Ryle argued that mental images were not a sort of ghostly picture postcard. He characterizes this fallacy Place Of course, as Smart recognised, this leaves the identity theory dependent on a physicalist account of colour. His early account of colour was too behaviourist, and could not deal, for example, with the reversed spectrum problem, but he later gave a realist and objectivist account Smart Armstrong had been realist about colour but Smart worried that if so colour would be a very idiosyncratic and disjunctive concept, of no cosmic importance, of no interest to extraterrestrials for instance who had different visual systems.
Prompted by Lewis in conversation Smart came to realize that this was no objection to colours being objective properties. One first gives the notion of a normal human percipient with respect to colour for which there are objective tests in terms of ability to make discriminations with respect to colour. This can be done without circularity. Then Smart elucidated the notion of colour in terms of the discriminations with respect to colour of normal human percipients in normal conditions say cloudy Scottish daylight.
Mind Body Debate
This account of colour may be disjunctive and idiosyncratic. Maxwell's equations might be of interest to Alpha Centaurians but hardly our colour concepts. Anthropocentric and disjunctive they may be, but objective none the less. Hilbert identifies colours with reflectances, thus reducing the idiosyncrasy and disjunctiveness. A few epicycles are easily added to deal with radiated light, the colours of rainbows or the sun at sunset and the colours due to diffraction from feathers.
John Locke was on the right track in making the secondary qualities objective as powers in the object, but erred in making these powers to be powers to produce ideas in the mind rather than to make behavioural discriminations. Also Smart would say that if powers are dispositions we should treat the secondary qualities as the categorical bases of these powers, e. Locke's view suggested that the ideas have mysterious qualia observed on the screen of an internal mental theatre.
Let us return to the issue of us having a yellow, purple and green striped sense datum or mental image and yet there being no yellow, purple and green striped thing in the brain. The identity theorist Smart can say that sense data and images are not real things in the world: Sentences ostensibly about the average plumber can be translated into, or elucidated in terms of, sentences about plumbers. So also there is having a green sense datum or image but not sense data or images, and the having of a green sense datum or image is not itself green.
So it can, so far as this goes, easily be a brain process which is not green either. Thus Placep. When we describe the after-image as green Quoting these passages, David Chalmersp. Of course a lot of things go on in me when I have a yellow after image for example my heart is pumping blood through my brain. However they do not typically go on then: Of course to be topic neutral is to be able to be both physical and mental, just as arithmetic is.
Armstrong emphasise the notion of causality. Lewis's was a particularly clear headed presentation of the identity theory in which he says I here refer to the reprint in Lewisp. My argument is this: The definitive characteristic of any sort of experience as such is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects.
But we materialists believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since these physical states possess the definitive character of experiences, they must be experiences.
Similarly, Robert Kirk has argued for the impossibility of zombies. If the supposed zombie has all the behavioural and neural properties ascribed to it by those who argue from the possibility of zombies against materialism, then the zombie is conscious and so not a zombie.
Thus there is no need for explicit use of Ockham's Razor as in Smart though not in Place Words for colours, smells, sounds, tastes and so on also occur. One can regard common sense platitudes containing both these sorts of these words as constituting a theory and we can take them as theoretical terms of common sense psychology and thus as denoting whatever entities or sorts of entities uniquely realise the theory.
Then if certain neural states do so too as we believe then the mental states must be these neural states. In his he allows for tact in extracting a consistent theory from common sense.
One cannot uncritically collect platitudes, just as in producing a grammar, implicit in our speech patterns, one must allow for departures from what on our best theory would constitute grammaticality.
However, unlike other material objects e. In short we have 'minds'. This is known as dualism. Dualism is the view that the mind and body both exist as separate entities.
Mind - Wikipedia
Descartes argued that the mind interacts with the body at the pineal gland. This form of dualism or duality proposes that the mind controls the body, but that the body can also influence the otherwise rational mind, such as when people act out of passion. Most of the previous accounts of the relationship between mind and body had been uni-directional. Monism There are two basic types of monism: Mental processes can be identified with purely physical processes in the central nervous system, and that human beings are just complicated physiological organisms, no more than that.
Ultimately, only mental objects i.
Bishop Berkeley claimed that what we think of as our body is merely the perception of mind. Before you reject this too rapidly consider the results of a recent study. Scientists asked three hemiplegic i. All three claimed, despite evidence to the contrary in the mirror in front of them, that they could move their right and left hands equally well. Further, two of the three stroke victims claimed that an experimental stooge who faked paralysis i.
Thinking having freedom of choice is a mental event, yet can cause behavior to occur muscles move in response to a thought. Thinking can therefore be said to make things happen, "mind moves matter".
Behaviorists believe that psychology should only be concerned with "observable actions", namely stimulus and response. Different areas of the brain are involved in different types of memory Fig. Your brain has to pay attention and rehearse in order for an event to move from short-term to long-term memory — called encoding.
Structures of the limbic system involved in memory formation. The prefrontal cortex holds recent events briefly in short-term memory. The hippocampus is responsible for encoding long-term memory.
The Mind/Brain Identity Theory
Short-term memory, also called working memory, occurs in the prefrontal cortex. It stores information for about one minute and its capacity is limited to about 7 items. For example, it enables you to dial a phone number someone just told you.
It also intervenes during reading, to memorize the sentence you have just read, so that the next one makes sense. Long-term memory is processed in the hippocampus of the temporal lobe and is activated when you want to memorize something for a longer time.
This memory has unlimited content and duration capacity. It contains personal memories as well as facts and figures. Skill memory is processed in the cerebellum, which relays information to the basal ganglia.
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It stores automatic learned memories like tying a shoe, playing an instrument, or riding a bike. Ventricles and cerebrospinal fluid The brain has hollow fluid-filled cavities called ventricles Fig. Inside the ventricles is a ribbon-like structure called the choroid plexus that makes clear colorless cerebrospinal fluid CSF. CSF flows within and around the brain and spinal cord to help cushion it from injury. This circulating fluid is constantly being absorbed and replenished. CSF is produced inside the ventricles deep within the brain.
CSF fluid circulates inside the brain and spinal cord and then outside to the subarachnoid space. Common sites of obstruction: There are two ventricles deep within the cerebral hemispheres called the lateral ventricles. They both connect with the third ventricle through a separate opening called the foramen of Monro. The third ventricle connects with the fourth ventricle through a long narrow tube called the aqueduct of Sylvius. From the fourth ventricle, CSF flows into the subarachnoid space where it bathes and cushions the brain.