The 30th Great Canberra Swap Meet – EPIC
Purchase Swap Meet Liability Insurance from ACT. Show policies start at $39 and annual policies start at $ Quick online checkout process. Some media outlets had carelessly listed the Coles' supermarkets participating in Saturday's Little Shop Swap Day AND LEFT THE ACT OUT. Canberra Swap Meet. will be available here in mid The Swap Meet Organiser. VVCMCC. PO Box Manuka ACT
Levin, a veteran lawmaker, had a clear-eyed understanding of the way the banks operated.
Now he had the chance to do something about the system that was generating those loans: Yet these hapless borrowers had already generated vast profits for others. It was rarely possible to track an individual subprime mortgage through the financial Cuisinart in which Wall Street transformed such loans into profitable instruments.
Thus the eventual buyers had no idea whether the underlying mortgages were being paid or not. I was, however, able to follow one such mortgage: But there was more to it than that.
By tracking a selected sample of mortgage-backed housing bonds, the index would reflect the mortgage-backed securities market as a whole, and by extension, the American housing market.
Launched in Januarythe ABX also offered the attractive option of buying and selling index futures.
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That is, traders could now place bets on the movement of the entire housing market. Goldman was quicker than most to place negative bets, predicting that the housing market would tumble as more and more homeowners defaulted. So, as Denzel Mitchell struggled to keep a roof over his family, the bank that owned his loan was betting that he and others would fail. Goldman was by no means the only establishment to use the ABX. These particular London traders oversaw what the bank management termed the synthetic credit portfolio, largely composed of exotic derivatives.
Such transactions were cascading through the global financial system in those years, powered by the bank-promoted boom in subprime loans.
Vastly magnifying the scale of operations was another recently invented instrument: There was no limit on the number of bets riding on a particular bond; a post-crash inquiry found one that had nine separate CDS bets against it.
Bythe bets were going bad at an ever-accelerating rate. Huge financial institutions began to crumble. Bear Stearns collapsed in March On September 15 came the cataclysm of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. An internal Federal Reserve email sent five days later, and published here for the first time, tersely conveys the prevailing mood of official panic as Morgan Stanley, Timothy Geithner, and Goldman Sachs attempted to circle the wagons: Washington rushed to shore up the collapsing financial system.
Fearful of public outrage over such generosity to those who had fomented the disaster in the first place, the Fed and the banks struggled to keep the numbers a secret. Fortunately for the bankers, they had protection from the top.
Despite such welcome news, the banks did face the unwelcome prospect of new rules and regulations likely to impinge on cherished modes of operation. They prepared their defenses. The Volcker Rule was even more anathema to the banks themselves, which, flush with bailout cash, were once again generating profitable trades and executive bonuses. Bankers and their representatives argued vehemently that their prop trading had absolutely nothing to do with the crash, despite the trillions in bailout money needed to keep them afloat.
The Volcker Rule meanwhile had to undergo a long and tortuous gestation, beginning with its passage through Congress as part of the financial reform legislation introduced by Senator Chris Dodd and Representative Barney Frank. On hand to observe the progress of the legislation was Jeff Connaughton, formerly a high-powered lobbyist, who had recently signed on as chief of staff to the reform-minded senator Ted Kaufman, a Democrat from Delaware.
In his instructive memoir The Payoff, Connaughton describes how the banking committee functioned: Staffers gave lobbyists information about bills being drafted or what one senator had said to another.?.?.?. The lobbyists passed the information on to their clients in the banking or insurance or accounting industry.?.?.?. Sometimes within an hour, the news would be emailed to the entire financial-services industry and all of its lobbyists. With multiple leakers from the banking committee keeping K Street well informed, the banking world had complete transparency into bill drafting.
Michael Paese, for example, was the deputy staff director of the House Financial Services Committee for seven years until moving to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, a trade group, in September The lobbyists saw little point in exercising their skills on Carl Levin, a seasoned politician whose views on the banks were well known.
The staffers basically used that as leverage: Among other concessions extracted by the Massachusetts senator was a loophole in the Volcker Rule allowing banks to own a small stake in hedge funds after all. Thanks to such negotiations, the rule acquired significant concessions before Dodd—Frank was passed on July 21, If you kept a supply of, for example, foreign-currency swaps in stock, just in case a customer ordered some, were you engaging in prop trading?
Such issues could keep many lawyers well remunerated for a long time. Unsurprisingly, the banks and similarly interested parties launched waves of lawyers and lobbyists at the agencies to ensure that rules were crafted to their liking. A painstaking academic study of the public record by Kimberly Krawiec of Duke University revealed that the agencies were subjected to almost 1, meetings with those seeking to influence their deliberations, the vast majority with representatives of the financial industry.
An ambiguous word here, an obscure footnote there, could be worth billions down the road. They then called on foreign embassies in Washington to say that their banks back home, now limited by the rule to buying only US Treasuries, would consequently be barred from buying bonds issued by their own governments.
According to the complaint, Cherry Auction had the right to terminate vendors for any reason whatsoever and through that right had the ability to control the activities of vendors on the premises. In addition, Cherry Auction promoted the swap meet and controlled the access of customers to the swap meet area. In terms of control, the allegations before us are strikingly similar to those in Shapiro and Gershwin.
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There, the concessionaire selling the bootleg recordings had a licensing agreement with the department store H. Green Company that required the concessionaire and its employees to "abide by, observe and obey all regulations promulgated from time to time by the H. Green Company," and H.
Green Company had the "unreviewable discretion" to discharge the concessionaires' employees. Green Company was not actively involved in the sale of records and the concessionaire controlled and supervised the individual employees. Green's ability to police its concessionaire - which parallels Cherry Auction's ability to police its vendors under Cherry Auction's similarly broad contract with its vendors - was sufficient to satisfy the control requirement.
Nevertheless, because of defendant's "pervasive participation in the formation and direction" of the direct infringers, including promoting them i.
As the promoter and organizer of the swap meet, Cherry Auction wields the same level of control over the direct infringers as did the Gershwin defendant.
See also Polygram, F. The plaintiff's allegations encompass many substantive benefits to Cherry Auction from the infringing sales. These include the payment of a daily rental fee by each of the infringing vendors; a direct payment to Cherry Auction by each customer in the form of an admission fee, and incidental payments for parking, food and other services by customers seeking to purchase infringing recordings.
They ask that we restrict the financial benefit prong to the precise facts presented in Shapiro, where defendant H. Green Company received a 10 or 12 per cent commission from the direct infringers' gross receipts. Cherry Auction points to the low daily rental fee paid by each vendor, discounting all other financial benefits flowing to the swap meet, and asks that we hold that the swap meet is materially similar to a mere landlord.
The facts alleged by Fonovisa, however, reflect that the defendants reap substantial financial benefits from admission fees, concession stand sales and parking fees, all of which flow directly from customers who want to buy the counterfeit recordings at bargain basement prices. The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged direct financial benefit.
In Poloygram, for example, direct infringers were participants in a trade show who used infringing music to communicate with attendees and to cultivate interest in their wares. The court held that the trade show participants "derived a significant financial benefit from the attention" that attendees paid to the infringing music.
In this case, the sale of pirated recordings at the Cherry Auction swap meet is a "draw" for customers, as was the performance of pirated music in the dance hall cases and their progeny. Universal City, U. Contributory infringement has been described as an outgrowth of enterprise liability, see 3 Nimmer [a], at ; Demetrigdes v. The classic statement of the doctrine is in Gershwin, F. The disputed issue is whether plaintiff adequately alleged that Cherry Auction materially contributed to the infringing activity.
We have little difficulty in holding that the allegations in this case are sufficient to show material contribution to the infringing activity. Indeed, it would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place in the massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by the swap meet. These services include, inter alia, the provision of space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers. Yet Cherry Auction actively strives to provide the environment and the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive.
Its participation in the sales cannot be termed "passive," as Cherry Auction would prefer. Given the allegations that the local sheriff lawfully requested that Cherry Auction gather and share basic, identifying information about its vendors, and that Cherry Auction failed to comply, the defendant appears to qualify within the last portion of the district court's own standard that posits liability for protecting infringers' identities.
See 2 William F. In Inwood Laboratories, U. As Cherry Auction points out, the Inwood case involved a manufacturer-distributor, and the Inwood standard has generally been applied in such cases.
The Court in Inwood, however, laid down no limiting principle that would require defendant to be a manufacturer or distributor.