Recent scholarship seeks to correct this lacuna by stressing that the Platonic Natürliche Moral und philosophische Ethik bei Alber- tus Magnus, –, esp. his special relation to the Platonic heritage and the high value he attributes to it . In addition, the Aristotelian understanding of the means-end relation must be correctly This teaching is Platonic in origin (see Republic I, db). of ethics under anthropology, as Kluxen has rightly established (Philosophische Ethik, p. On Foucault's own account of his relationship to Critical Theory, cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Uber die Moglichkeit einer philosophischen Ethik," in ), especially 5; and The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans.
The third class, then, has no specific virtue of its own. But since Socrates does not elaborate on the dispositions of justice and moderation any further, there seems to be only a fine line between the functions of justice and moderation in the city. That there are four virtues rather than three probably also reflects the fact that this catalogue of four was a fixture in tradition. As will emerge in connection with the virtues in the individual soul, the distinction between justice and moderation is far less problematic in the case of the individual than in that of the city as a whole, because in the individual soul, internal self-control and external self-restraint are clearly different attitudes.
As this survey shows, the virtues are no longer confined to knowledge. They also contain right beliefs and attitudes of harmony and compliance — extensions that are apt to make up for deficiencies in the explanation of certain virtues in earlier dialogues. The promise to establish the isomorphic structure of the city and soul has not been forgotten. After the definition and assignment of the four virtues to the three classes of the city, the investigation turns to the role and function of the virtues in the soul.
The soul is held to consist of three partscorresponding to the three classes in the city. Indeed, there is no indication of separate parts of the soul in any of the earlier dialogues; irrational desires are attributed to the influence of the body. In the Republic, by contrast, the soul itself becomes the source of the appetites and desires. The difference between the rational and the appetitive part is easily justified, because the opposition between the decrees of reason and the various kinds of unreasonable desires is familiar to everyone d—e.
But the phenomenon of moral indignation is treated as evidence for a psychic force that is reducible neither to reason nor to any of the appetites; it is rather an ally of reason in a well-ordered soul, a force opposed to unruly appetites e—c.
José Antonio Giménez Salinas. Theorie und Praxis bei Platon
This concludes the proof that there are three parts in the soul corresponding to the three classes in the city — namely the rational part in the wisdom of the rulers, the spirited part, which is manifested in the courage of the soldiers, the appetitive part, which is manifested in the rest of the population, whose defining motivation is material gain.
In the city there is justice if the members of the three classes mind their own business; in the individual soul, justice likewise consists in each part fulfilling its own function. This presupposes that the two upper parts have been given the right kind of training and education in order to control the appetitive part d—a. The three other virtues are then assigned to the respective parts of the soul. Courage is the excellence of the spirited part, wisdom belongs to the rational part, and moderation is the consent of all three about who should rule and who should obey.Thomas von Aquin: Philosophische Ethik - im Überblick - Ethik 13
Justice turns out to be the overall unifying quality of the soul c—e. For, the just person not only refrains from meddling with what is not his, externally, but also harmonizes the three parts of the soul internally. While justice is order and harmony, injustice is its opposite: Justice and injustice in the soul are, then, analogous to health and illness in the body.
This comparison suffices to bring the investigation to its desired result. If justice is health and harmony of the soul, then injustice must be disease and disorder.
Hence, it is clear that justice is a good state of the soul that makes its possessor happy, and injustice is its opposite. Just as no-one in his right mind would prefer to live with a ruined body so no-one would prefer to live with a diseased soul. In principle, the discussion of justice has therefore reached its promised goal at the end of Book IV. That the discussion does not end here but occupies six more books, is due most of all to several loose ends that need to be tied up.
This gap will be filled, at least in part, by the description of the communal life without private property and family in Book V. More importantly, nothing has been said about the rulers and their particular kind of knowledge. Socrates addresses this problem with the provocative thesis c—d: A short summary of the upshot of the educational program must suffice here.
The future philosophers, both women and men, are selected from the group of guardians whose general cultural training they share. If they combine moral firmness with quickness of mind, they are subject to a rigorous curriculum of higher learning that will prepare them for the ascent from the world of the senses to the world of intelligence and truth, an ascent whose stages are summed up in the similes of the Sun, the Line, and the Cave a—b.
This study is to last for another five years. Successful candidates are then sent back into the Cave as administrators of ordinary political life for about 15 years. At the age of fifty the rulers are granted the pursuit of philosophy, an activity that is interrupted by periods of service as overseers of the order of the state. That is no mean feat in a society where external and civil wars were a constant threat, and often enough ended in the destruction of the entire city.
Plato seems to think so; he characterizes each class by its specific kind of desire and its respective good c: That human beings find, or at least try to find, satisfaction in the kinds of goods they cherish is a point further pursued in the depiction of the decay of the city and its ruling citizens, from the best — the aristocracy of the mind — down to the worst — the tyranny of lust, in Books VIII and IX.
A discussion of the tenability of this explanation of political and psychological decadence will not be attempted here. It is supposed to show that all inferior forms of government of city and soul are doomed to fail because of the inherent tensions between the goods that are aimed for.
He clearly goes on the assumption that human beings are happy insofar as they achieve the goals they cherish. Why, then, reduce the third class to animal-like creatures with low appetites, as suggested by the comparison of the people to a strong beast that must be placated a—c? This comparison is echoed later in the comparison of the soul to a multiform beast, where reason just barely controls the hydra-like heads of the appetites, and then only with the aid of a lion-like spirit c—d.
Is Plato thereby giving vent to anti-democratic sentiments, showing contempt for the rabble, as has often been claimed? He can at least be cleared of the suspicion that the workers are mere serfs of the upper classes, because he explicitly grants them the free enjoyment of all the customary goods that he has denied to the upper classes a: Plato seems to sidestep his own insight that all human beings have an immortal soul and have to take care of it as best they can, as he not only demands in the Phaedo but is going to confirm in a fanciful way in the Myth of Er at the end of Republic Book X.
The life-style designated for the upper classes also seems open to objections. Theirs is an austere camp-life; not all of them will be selected for higher education. Their intellectual pursuits are also not entirely enviable, as a closer inspection would show.
Pufendorf's Moral and Political Philosophy
They are also not to enjoy open-ended research, but are rather subject to a mental training that is explicitly designed to turn their minds away from the enjoyment of all worldly beauty in order to focus exclusively on the contemplation of the Forms. This is indicated in the injunctions concerning the study of astronomy and harmonics a—d. The universe is not treated as an admirable cosmos, with the explicit purpose of providing moral and intellectual support to the citizens, in the way Plato is going to state in the Timaeus and in the Laws.
The system resembles a well-oiled machine where everyone has their appointed function and economic niche; but its machine-like character seems repellent, given that no deviations are permitted from the prescribed pattern. If innovations are forbidden, no room seems to be left for creativity and personal development. It states that every object, animal, and person has a specific function or work ergon.
If it performs its function well, it does well: His aim is rather more limited: He wants to present a model, and to work out its essential features. Rather, he wants to explain the generation and decay typical of each political system and the psychopathology of its leaders. It is unlikely that Plato presupposes that there are pure representatives of these types, though some historical states may have come closer to being representatives than others.
Was Plato aware of the fact that his black-and-white picture of civic life in his model state disregards the claim of individuals to have their own aims and ends, and not to be treated like automata, with no thoughts and wishes of their own? These works are the Symposium and the Phaedrus.
For though each dialogue should be studied as a unity of its own, it is also necessary to treat the individual dialogues as part of a wider picture. Instead, they concentrate on self-preservation, self-improvement, and self-completion. The Symposium is often treated as a dialogue that predates the Republic, most of all because it mentions neither the immortality nor the tripartition of the soul. But its dramatic staging — the praise of Eros by a company of symposiasts — is not germane to the otherworldly and ascetic tendencies of the Gorgias and the Phaedo.
Contrary to all other speakers, Socrates denies that Eros is a god, because the gods are in a state of perfection. Love, by contrast, is a desire of the needy for the beautiful and the good c—c. Eros is a powerful demon, a being between the mortal and the immortal, an eternally needy hunter of the beautiful.
Human beings share that demonic condition; for they are neither good nor bad, but desire the good and the beautiful, the possession of which would constitute happiness for them.
Because all people want happiness, they pursue the good as well as they can a—b. In each case they desire the particular kinds of objects that they hope will fulfill their needs. Such fulfillment is not a passive possession; it is rather the objects of love are deemed to be essential in the struggle for self-preservation, self-completion, and self-fulfillment d: And this is possible in one way only: In the case of human beings this need expresses itself in different ways.
Starting with the love of one beautiful body, the individual gradually learns to appreciate not only all physical beauty, but also the beauty of the mind, and in the end she gets a glimpse of the supreme kind of beauty, namely the Form of the Beautiful itself — a beauty that is neither relative, nor changeable, nor a matter of degree.
There is no talk of a painful liberation from the bonds of the senses, or of a turn-around of the entire soul that is reserved only for the better educated.
First, all human beings aim for their own self-preservation and -completion. Second, this drive finds its expression in the products of their work, in creativity. There is no indication that individuals must act as part of a community. Though the communitarian aspect of the good and beautiful comes to the fore in the high praise of the products of the legendary legislators e—athe ultimate assent to the Beautiful itself is up to the individual. The Lysis shares its basic assumption concerning the intermediary state of human nature between good and bad, and regards need as the basis of friendship.
The idea that eros is the incentive to sublimation and self-completion is worked out further in the Phaedrus. Although the close relationship between the two dialogues is generally acknowledged, the Phaedrus is commonly regarded as a much later work.
But this difference seems due to a difference in perspective rather than to a change of mind. The discussion in the Symposium is deliberately confined to the conditions of self-immortalization in this life, while the Phaedrus takes the discussion beyond the confines of this life.
The three parts of the soul in the Phaedrus are not supposed to justify the separation of people into three classes.
They explain, rather, the different routes taken by individuals in their search for beauty and their levels of success. The misuse of rhetoric is exemplified by the speech attributed to the orator Lysias, a somewhat contrived plea to favor a non-lover rather than a lover. Once restored to his senses the lover will shun his former beloved and break all his promises. See Auerfor an association with Hohfeld. Though it may also be classed as a passive moral quality as in allowing someone rightly [recte] to receive thingsit is active insofar as it permits us to command persons and possess things.
Each kind of power may be acquired, lost, or held in certain ways: See Hruschka [ et alia]. Pufendorf clarifies obligation at DJN I. Both are needed, since reverence without fear does not explain the compellingness of obligation, while fear without reverence does not explain its legitimacy.
However, the so-called natural goodness or evil of things, their ability to benefit or harm us, provide the rationale for the imposition of moral entitites by intelligent beings from which obligation springs. That is, they have especially in the case of natural goods a sort of evidentiary function, explaining why the obliger wills such-and-such, and why the obligee wills or might be motivated to its acceptance.
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - DGPhil Kongress
Thus, when discussing moral persons Pufendorf says that the impositions which produce that rank or status should have a positive effect solidus effectus on humankind and not be made frivolously, as when Caligula declared his horse a senator, when the ancient Romans deified their emperors, and when papists, still, declare saints by a similar sort of post-mortem canonization — all with normative impact. Moreover, since what benefits or harms humans is known through experience, empirical investigation, and knowledge of the past historythese operate as heuristics for determining our obligations and explain why, in some cases, there may be disagreement about them.
Of course, such differences do not concern whether moral commands as such formally obligate or not, but whether specific actions are in fact morally commanded. SeidlerFetscher DJN alone contains two versions: These two treatments share a common conception of legal obligation as justified imposition by a beneficent superior with access to sanctions.
This does not make them redundant, however, even if the political institutions created to eliminate the second, pre-civil state of nature are enjoined by same natural law that also commands or induces humans to leave their prior, pre-cultural and bestial states. Civil sovereignty and its mechanisms are needed precisely because the cooperative institutions e. Indeed, since similar difficulties arise among civil states themselves, in an international state of nature, there is need for yet another solution at that level.
This discussion provides a bridge between the conceptual analysis of law and obligation, in Book I, and the following chapter II. The latter show humans to be weak, diverse, and sometimes perverse: For mutual assistance to be possible, however, and to avoid the difficulties continually generated by the traits above, human action must be constrained by laws of freedom, as it were.
Without these, humans would sink below the level of brutes, whose welfare is non-voluntarily secured by physical laws, and they would remain at liberty only to disrupt and destroy one another. This sort of inconsistency in human nature was — on religious, rational, prudential, and it seems aesthetic grounds — unacceptable to Pufendorf. The natural state is a theoretical mechanism for further articulating these considerations.
A relative notion, it appears in three distinct but overlapping versions, the third of which is specially elaborated by the DJN VII. Each version involves a polarity or implied contrast: The second natural state, with respect to oneself in sedesignates the basic helplessness of solitary humans and their almost inevitable lapse into an uncultivated, bestial life without mutual assistance. Classical accounts of this state depict individual humans as frustrated in their most basic needs and desires, and as incapable of the refinement needed to develop their distinctive faculties and exercise their freedom.
Human interaction can sometimes and to some extent eliminate the natural state in this sense — a process facilitated by their prior, and concurrent, emergence from the mere state of humanity. As the third natural state shows, however, humans may also threaten, endanger, or interfere with one another unless their freedom is effectively restrained by law. Here law means more than the self-interpreted moral law already operative in the first two states of nature which, pace Hobbes, are not entirely lawless or amoral ; rather it refers to civil law which must be imposed by a political superior with both the authority and the effective power to command.
Hence this natural state is best described as a pre-civil state, in contrast to the pre-cultural and merely human states. Instead, norms emerge as one leaves such natural conditions.
As already suggested, the three conditions overlap. That is, as neither beasts nor gods, they lack the automatism of the former and the spontaneous goodness of the latter, and always carry a fallible burden of judgment, as it were.
The latter two states may coincide as well, though usually incompletely, in that humans may exit a pre-cultural state of need while still in a pre-civil state of insecurity, or they may enjoy the security of a civil state while relatively deprived of cultural goods.
As well, even though need satisfaction and cultural development typically occur before and apart from political order, in cities as opposed to states, the latter sometimes seem a precondition of the former processes — as Pufendorf knew well from the circumstances of the Thirty Years War. The pre-cultural and pre-civil states of nature especially i.
The former is purely mythical or hypothetical in that no humans can exist without their fellows. Complete non-cooperation or complete hostility are simply impossible, since no one would survive, and the only reason to consider such scenarios is as heuristic devices highlighting the conditions that humans actually inhabit. Behme a Indeed, as Rousseau would iterate in his own way, extreme versions of the natural state are mere extrapolations from the more limited, or mixed, conditions found in actual human history and experience — as when rival families, clans, states, or occasionally formerly cultivated and civil-ized individuals e.
The paradoxical upshot of his examination is that humans as such never were, are, or will be in a pure, full, or perfect natural state, since it would be a completely barbarous, bellicose, and thus deadly condition. Thus far, Hobbes was correct. Accordingly, humans cannot ever — at least in this life — entirely leave the natural state in all three senses behind, as they are always imperfectly socialized, only partially cultivated, and incompletely or inadequately civil-ized politic-ized.
This explains their lifelong subjection to moral law and obligation however understoodand their need — Pufendorf thought — for some sort of civil subjugation.
That is, insofar as they manage to survive and thrive at all, they do so through incompletely realized forms of social cooperation that must in a variety of ways be constantly maintained and improved.
This law does not rest on an intrinsic morality of actions, an absolute value of persons, on common agreement among humans, or even on the long-term utility that generally follows compliance with its injunctions DJN II. Pufendorf acknowledges the fundamental reality of self-love and the possibility of reading the natural law as a merely instrumental rule.
However, he denies that self-love is the only human motive or necessarily in conflict with other motives, and argues that in fact its aims can be fully or really achieved only through the natural law; this does command humans to love themselves, albeit in a mitigated, restrained, and thus more successful way.
Hence the natural law does not forbid the pursuit of self-interest but merely regulates it, enjoining both the care of self and the care of others that humans already seek in a limited and inadequate fashion. The argument certainly requires its voluntarist and theistic premise, but it relies as much on the compatible and, supposedly, confirmatory deliverances of general human experience. In practice, given the stakes involved according to either interpretation, it often may not matter which is emphasized.
The first category is treated separately in the pedagogically oriented DO I. The three most important human institutions governed by hypothetical laws of nature are speech, dominion over things property and price the valuation of thingsand human sovereignty including the civil state — the subjects of DJN IV—V and VI—VIII.
Book II concludes with three more chapters treating the various duties toward ourselves II. Before turning to various categories of hypothetical duties in Book III, Pufendorf examines several absolute requirements toward other humans. The first is the prime natural law directive — also found in Grotius and Hobbes — without which social life could not exist: The basis of this requirement is not human nature regarded metaphysically or transcendentally as an absolute value, but a so-called equality of right or law ius consisting merely of our joint obligation per natural law to cultivate a social life.
This introduces the important distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, the latter consisting of so-called duties of humanity which, though owed in the same sense as perfect duties, cannot be compelled. Duties of humanity often depend on special circumstances. Cavallar; Hunter a Since imperfect duties of humanity do not suffice for maintaining social relations, particularly those involving precise mutual expectations, Pufendorf introduces DJN III.
The natural law stipulates no specifics here but merely commands that we enter into some such consensual arrangements, since without them sociality would be hampered and humans remain in the natural state.
Pact-generated obligations are both adventitious, or based upon some antecedent human deed responding to circumstance, and perfect in the sense of specific and compellable. They arise from either unilateral promises or bilateral agreements, and they create perfect rights i.
Given its importance for the development of human social life, five more chapters are devoted to the topic of promises and pacts: The next two sections will shed light on some of those other sources. Benson and Giles Constable Oxford: A Doxographic Approach, ed. Moreover, it allows Albert to explain reality philosophically—primarily drawing on Aristotle but also incorporating other suitable philosophical traditions and empirical sciences—in harmony with the Scripture and Christian belief.
Plato Albert considers himself to be closest to the philosophical tradition of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, yet he stresses that in philosophy you can- not avoid Plato. Albert interpreted the former doctrine as equivalent to the theory of the inchoa- tio formarum that he adopted and developed further.
Sed Plato et Pythagoras idem quidem dicere intendebant, sed nescierunt exprimere materiae potentiam, quae est formae incohatio. Et ideo dixerunt a datore primo dari for- mas et non esse in materia, sed tamen materiam mereri formam, meritum materiae vocan- tes id quod Aristoteles vocavit formae incohationem sive potentiam sive privationem.